The growing disrepute of the Judicial Power in Chile is rooted in successive reports of influence peddling and other corrupt practices. In a detailed column for CIPER (www.ciperchile.cl), a lawyer denounces the particular case of the Administrative Corporation of the Judiciary (CAPJ), whose case distribution algorithm is allegedly being manipulated: «When asked for explanations, the CAPJ has entangled itself in its responses for months, answering incompletely and unsatisfactorily, falling into contradictions, and increasing distrust in the system’s integrity.»
Political crises in Chile are predominantly institutional, and only exceptionally do they turn into social crises that destabilize the State. Generally, these crises arise because the main problem is not addressed with appropriate political decisions from the highest levels of the State, as is currently the case with the Judiciary and the Supreme Court. The crisis they face has a dual nature: it is organic within the Judiciary and affects the general functioning of the entire system. A comprehensive solution is needed, which necessarily involves the government and Parliament. A negative evolution of this process could dissolve what little public trust remains in the justice system and generate trends towards self-help solutions that would severely damage the legitimacy of the rule of law. According to the most recent National Survey Signos (www.signosanalytics.cl), 90.3% of respondents believe there is influence peddling in the Supreme Court; 96.5% think judges should be subject to the Lobbying Law, like other public officials; and 94.5% consider it necessary to change the procedure for appointing judges and Supreme Court justices. Previous surveys by the same consultant indicate that more than 60% of citizens trust institutions less than they did five years ago, and there is a marked perception of corruption.
This distrust stems from an accumulation of internal problems affecting the public image of the Judiciary and the political mistake of trying to encapsulate them as partial issues without significance for its reputation. The Supreme Court’s neglect of functional control is evident, both in its collegiate operation and in its auxiliary systems, which operate with de facto discretion and without responsibility for their actions or omissions during the crisis. An extreme case is the CAPJ, responsible for the logistical, technical, and administrative support of judicial operations, which manages the civil case distribution algorithm, one of the fundamental aspects of equal justice under the law. This distribution has been questioned several times without satisfactory responses from the highest court.
CAPJ AND PUBLIC TRUST
The Chilean Administrative Corporation of the Judiciary’s (CAPJ) history is paradigmatic of mismanagement. Its national director, Mr. Ricardo Guzmán Sanza (currently in an indeterminate situation due to an internal investigation regarding a multi-million-dollar purchase of Lexus cars for Supreme Court justices), was accused in 2016 of serious inaccuracies regarding his professional qualifications. Guzmán claimed to have a doctoral degree from a Belgian university, validated by the University of Chile. However, the degree turned out to be fake, as the Université Libre des Sciences de l’Entreprise et des Technologies de Bruxelles (ULSETB), where he supposedly obtained the doctorate, was never accredited in Belgium. The Royal Decree n°15223 of May 2006, which supposedly authorized its creation, does not exist in the Belgian Official Gazette. The European School of Management (EGEU) in Chile, which acted as an intermediary for the degree, disappeared shortly after the accusation, and the University of Chile annulled the validation. All this was documented in an extensive report eight years ago, which was later referred to the North Central Prosecutor’s Office (under prosecutor Ximena Chong), although no known results have emerged.
Recently, evidence has surfaced that the Judiciary’s case distribution algorithm, managed by the CAPJ, has been manipulated to illegally select courts that ensure favorable outcomes (forum shopping). Among these cases are the bankruptcy of Curauma S.A. #CasoCurauma #CuraumaCase (www.cb.cl / www.curauma.info) and the cross-border insolvency of LATAM Airlines (both in the 2nd Civil Court of Santiago); the fraudulent registration of used trucks ordered by the 28th Civil Court of Santiago to the Civil Registry; and the seizure of a property in the north of the country. These cases, reported by the victims, have been investigated as complex crimes, but with little will and progress from the Public Ministry.
The bankruptcy of Curauma and the cross-border insolvency of LATAM Airlines are possibly the most complex cases among those mentioned. Curiously, they share the same court, the same judge, the same type of case, and the same law firm (Claro & Cía / www.claro.cl). The latter acted as the plaintiff’s lawyer for EuroAmerica S.A. (www.euroamerica.cl) in the Curauma case and as the defense attorney for LATAM Airlines. In both cases, the correct application of the algorithm, according to the criteria explained by the CAPJ, would have resulted in different courts.
The Curauma case has dragged on for more than ten years, due to the judicial resistance of Chilean entrepreneur Manuel Cruzat Infante. It is full of administrative irregularities, as well as bankruptcy and financial crimes that would have been prevented in any neutral court. In its development, there is a suspicious judicial omission to maliciously paralyze a debt reorganization agreement in a Valparaíso court, and another suspicious action to induce an artificial judicial assignment in Santiago by manipulating the algorithm. This manipulation assigned the bankruptcy to the 2nd Civil Court, where, working against the clock, a trustee was appointed, and a core bankruptcy operation was closed, composed of EuroAmerica S.A. and its lawyers (Cristóbal Eyzaguirre and José Miguel Huerta, from the Claro & Cía firm / www.claro.cl), and Judge Inelia Duran of the 2nd Court, now Minister of the Santiago Court of Appeals, as inferred from ongoing trials and lawsuits.
The second case, that of LATAM Airlines, is almost a legal clone of Curauma, with the same insolvency matter, the same court in Santiago, the same lawyers Cristóbal Eyzaguirre and José Miguel Huerta (Claro & Cía firm), and the same judge. The judge’s management allowed LATAM Airlines to submit to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, quietly reorganizing its debts, harming minority creditors, and avoiding a trial in Chile.
A third case is the fraudulent registration of 65 trucks illegally assembled with used parts in Chile, ordered by the 28th Civil Court of Santiago in 2022. Substitute judge Lilian Esther Lizana issued rulings ordering the Civil Registry to register the vehicles, despite the law prohibiting the importation of used trucks. All cases were argued by the same lawyer, Luis Eduardo Muñoz Chacc, a partner of lawyer Cristián Mandujano Moreno, the partner of the aforementioned substitute judge. These vehicles, once registered and with circulation permits, could erase their tracks in some illegal fleet, possibly destined for wood theft, illegal salmon transport, or drugs, and other thefts.
THE TECHNICAL IDENTITY OF THE ALGORITHM
The alleged efficiency of the Judiciary’s case distribution algorithm managed by the CAPJ, aka the Administrative Corporation of the Judiciary, is questionable. An algorithm in computing is a set of established, ordered, and delimited steps or instructions to solve a problem, perform a calculation, or carry out a task. But the information the CAPJ has provided to describe what the algorithm designed for case distribution does is always incomplete, confusing, and full of questions and dark areas. This must be investigated because it jeopardizes the constitutional right to equality before the law and public probity in the administration of justice, as well as the particular interests of those directly affected.
When asked for explanations as part of the judicial process, the CAPJ has entangled itself in its responses for months, answering incompletely and unsatisfactorily, falling into contradictions, and increasing distrust in the integrity of the algorithm. In 2023, in an official response to a judicial request in the Curauma case, it dismissively stated:
«As for the sources of the Demand Distribution system, it is reported that they are not available, so it is not possible to refer to the function used to perform the random assignment.» [CAPJ response, 2023].
However, from its explanations, it is concluded that the system applied since 2014 transferred the same algorithm in use before that date to the new system. Moreover, the new system’s database is the same since 1997; that is, an ORACLE database in PL/SQL language. Therefore, if it is the same database, with the same programming language and the same algorithm, it is the same random assignment formula. The system in place until 2013, when Curauma entered the bankruptcy trial, and the one operating since 2014 are based on the same principles for case assignment, summarized in the following general steps: (i) assignment, if applicable; (ii) if the assignment does not apply, the case is assigned to the court with the fewest cases in the same category as the case being assigned; (iii) if there is more than one court with the fewest cases, the assignment is made using a random procedure.
Amid its incomplete explanations, the CAPJ mentioned the existence of an additional criterion preceding point 3, which was to assign the case in process to a court with fewer general admissions within the year, but then retracted, saying it was a mistake and had never been used.
All the information provided by the CAPJ has been incomplete; it is not known whether it is of their own making or a component of a vendor’s technological package, which would facilitate the auditing of its operation under the terms of the respective purchase contracts. If the procedure has been executed in ORACLE database administration PL/SQL language since before 2014, there would be continuity in the criteria for assigning cases, which is more important for verifying its application, even in the absence of the specific randomization formula used.
In this case, I personally consulted Professor Roberto Melipillán, PhD from the University of Michigan, USA, and professor at Chilean Universidad del Desarrollo, an expert in digital languages and a regular consultant on this subject. I reproduce his description below:
«Given the pre-existing definitions of the variables provided by the CAPJ, the PL/SQL language assigns a number to each court participating in the random process and randomly selects a number from that group to decide the case’s destination.» From this, it is inferred that the algorithm would consist of a deterministic sequence, generating a random number within the delimited range of a predefined set, resulting in a single random number within that range. From the first appearance of the number, the corresponding case is assigned to a court within the category set by the algorithm.
This description implies that the algorithm applied in the Santiago Civil Courts for random case distribution is the same as or very similar to the one previously used. The alleged efficiency of the new algorithm is therefore questionable, given its hidden inefficiencies and possible flaws, such as: (i) the algorithm does not ensure the integrity of the randomization process; (ii) the integrity of the database managed by the CAPJ is not verified, as it is unknown whether the administrator manipulated the historical data before the data entered the algorithm; (iii) it is unknown whether the algorithm is deterministic and reproducible, as it does not document whether a randomly generated number can be repeated.
The Judiciary’s case distribution algorithm does not offer the necessary guarantees for the Chilean justice system’s operation because its application has been questioned on numerous occasions. The judiciary, which should uphold the law, must urgently address this situation and provide the transparency needed to restore public confidence. Failure to do so will only exacerbate the crisis and further erode the legitimacy of the rule of law in Chile.
Fuente: ww.ciperchile.cl/2024/08/12/las-graves-consecuencias-de-manipular-la-justicia/
